Brief description of document

     This paper argues that the following five characteristics are essential for any irrigation management devolution program, if the objective is to produce sustainable improvements in the performance of irrigated agriculture. Where any of the characteristics are missing, the results will be correspondingly sacrificed.

1. a sustainable water right vested in a legally recognized WUA,
2. an agreed irrigation service,
3. balance between responsibility and authority devolved,
4. devolution of integrated management responsibility,
5. adequate incentives and sanctions to ensure accountability.

     First, we argue that the water right should be environmentally sustainable and vested in a legally recognized water users association. This enhances farmer confidence in the service and willingness to invest in the long-term viability of the system. Second, clear and binding irrigation service agreements between the government and the water users association (WUA) and between the WUA and the individual users create essential cross-accountability between parties and clarify expectations essential to effective management. Such agreements should also be implementable within the constraints of local management capacity and irrigation technology.

     Devolution programs tend to involve power struggles. This sometimes results in a transfer of responsibilities without commensurate authority. An example is in the case of Colombia, where, for the early schemes which were transferred, responsibility to implement O&M was given to the districts but the districts had no control over developing the O&M plan and budget. We argue that without a balance between responsibility and authority for key management tasks (the third element) the local organization will lack the ability and incentive to discharge its new responsibilities.

     The fourth element is integrated management responsibility, meaning that the local organization must have primary control over the three closely-interconnected roles of financial management, O&M and conflict resolution. Because of their inter-relatedness, where farmer organizations do not have primary control over all three, management will be overwhelmed by political disputes, speculation, corruption and standoffs.

     And fifth, organizational incentives and sanctions should be commensurate with whatever level of management control and accountability is required by the agreed irrigation service. This may sound obvious but it is commonly absent in centrally-financed irrigation agencies and development authorities. It is one of the main problems that devolution is supposed to solve.

     Three cases of irrigation management devolution are examined, each of which varies in the extent to which devolution contains the above set of elements. The three cases are from the USA, Colombia and Sri Lanka, and represent what is herein referred to as comprehensive, partial and minimal types of devolution, respectively. After describing each case of devolution we will examine the outcomes of each.

Complete document (48k)