Brief description of document

     The transfer program was undertaken entirely with existing DSI staff, and was implemented in the field by regional DSI O&M Division personnel. Extensive training and orientation programs were held to acquaint field personnel with the program and the approach to be used. A defining feature of the program was the approach of initiating action through existing local government structures and leaders rather than through a campaign of grass-roots organization of farmers. In this respect it differs sharply from many of the management transfer efforts which preceded it, especially those applied in Southeast and South Asia.

     Another characteristic of the program was the size of units transferred and the numbers of farmers served by each unit. Sizes of IA-managed units averaged 6,500 hectares -- much larger than the units organized to receive management responsibility in places like the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka in the 1980s. The organizational structure employed was a unified one, not the federated type found in large indigenous systems such as those in Nepal. Organizational structures are similar, in some respects, to those of irrigation districts in the United States, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, and Australia, and drainage districts in the Netherlands. There are strong similarities to the modulo organizations in Mexico, which is unsurprising given the interactions which took place early in the program.

     Initial results of the transfer included a doubling of irrigation fee collection rates and a shifting of O&M expenditures from the public to the private sector, an accumulation of reserves in some IAs for future capital purchases, a reduced wage bill for system O&M personnel, and indications of expansions of irrigated area in some transferred schemes. DSI personnel levels have been strongly resistant to reduction, even with the diminished need for staff as a result of the transfer program, limiting the actual cost savings to the government. There are indications, however, that O&M staff levels are beginning to decline, and significant financial savings by the government may lie ahead. The number of farmer complaints fielded by DSI has fallen dramatically in the wake of the transfer program. Although it is not known if the number of total complaints has declined, complaints are being handled at a local level rather than by higher level offices of DSI. The transfer program in Turkey is still young and time is required before its true impacts will be known.

     Second-generation problems and challenges are emerging, though, in the wake of the early successes of this initiative. These can be categorized in terms of the party on which they have their primary effect. Challenges for DSI include (1) the difficulty in reducing overall staff levels in general, and O&M staff levels in particular, following transfer, (2) the absence of a charging mechanism for bulk water supply to IAs, and the consequent absence of an economic restraint on demands for water, and (3) the indistinct vision of a new role for the agency in supporting existing irrigation in the post-transfer era.

     Nascent problems for IAs include (1) the undefined nature of water rights in Turkey, and the consequent insecurity of their claim on irrigation water, (2) restricted options for obtaining heavy maintenance equipment, (3) the lack of a legal basis for forming federations of IAs for joint purchasing and supplying “lumpy” services such as equipment maintenance, (4) the lack of a clear de facto policy on capital cost sharing for rehabilitation (and new system construction), (5) the need to increase direct farmer participation in IA governance and reduce dependence on village and municipal leaders in filling IA leadership roles, and (6) weak support service systems for IAs in some areas and regions.

     The flexible and pragmatic conduct of the transfer program to date, and the enthusiasm and capability apparent in many association leaders, offers reason for hope that problems will be met and addressed. In some areas action is already underway. A World Bank loan currently being appraised will help to ease the equipment constraint with subsidized purchase arrangements for IAs. The water rights situation, on the other hand, presents a potential problem of major dimensions which will require upper-level action to remedy. Other constraints will require concerted action by DSI, IAs, and other organizations. The real danger is that of complacency, in which the government washes its hands of irrigation management entirely and fails to apprehend its ongoing role in monitoring and addressing emerging problems in the area of policy, finance, regulation, oversight, and supporting services.

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